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Abstract
Background: Kenya has prioritized the attainment of universal health coverage (UHC) through the expansion of health
insurance coverage by the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF). In 2015, the NHIF introduced reforms in premium
contribution rates, benefit packages, and provider payment methods. We examined the influence of these reforms on NHIF’s
purchasing practices and their implications for strategic purchasing and health system goals of equity, efficiency and quality.
Methods:We conducted an embedded case study with the NHIF as the case and the reforms as embedded units of
analysis. We collected data at the national level and in two purposively selected counties through 41 in-depth interviews
with health financing stakeholders, facility managers and frontline providers; 4 focus group discussions with 51 NHIF
members; and, document reviews. We analysed the data using a Framework approach.
Results: The new NHIF reforms were characterized by weak purchasing actions. Firstly, the new premium contribution rates
were inadequately communicated and unaffordable for certain citizen groups. Secondly, while the new benefit packages
were reported to be based on service needs, preferences and values of the population, they were inadequately
communicated and unequally distributed across different citizen groups. In addition, the presence of service delivery
infrastructure gaps in public healthcare facilities and the pro-urban and pro-private distribution of contracted health facilities
compromised delivery of, and access to, these new services. Lastly, the new provider payment methods and rates were
considered inadequate, with delayed payments and weak links to financial accountability mechanisms which compromised
their ability to incentivize equity, efficiency and quality of healthcare delivery.
Conclusion:While NHIF sought to expand population and service coverage and reduce out-of-pocket payments with the
new reforms, weaknesses in the reforms’ design and implementation limited NHIF’s purchasing actions with negative
implications for the health system goals of equity, efficiency and quality. For the reforms to accelerate the country’s progress
towards UHC, policy makers at the NHIF and, national and county government should make deliberate efforts to align the
design and implementation of such reforms with strategic purchasing actions that are aimed at improving health system
goals.
Keywords: Universal health coverage, Strategic purchasing, Purchasing reforms, National Hospital Insurance Fund, Equity,
Efficiency, Quality
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Background
Health financing reforms for universal health cover-
age (UHC) in low and middle-income countries
(LMICs) have mainly focused on two health finan-
cing functions: revenue collection and pooling [1].
There is, however, increasing global recognition of
the importance of the third healthcare financing
function of purchasing as an important policy tool
towards achieving UHC [2–4]. UHC emphasizes fi-
nancial protection and equitable access to good-
quality health services according to one’s healthcare
needs [5]. Purchasing, which refers to the transfer of
pooled resources to healthcare providers for the
provision of healthcare services [6, 7], provides a
critical link between healthcare financing and health-
care service delivery, and facilitates efficiency, equity
and quality in health systems performance [2]. Pur-
chasing can either be passive or strategic. Passive
purchasing is the transfer of pooled resources to
providers based on historical or predetermined bud-
gets while strategic purchasing involves a deliberate
process of determining which services to buy, from
who and at what cost with the aim of maximizing
health system performance [2, 6, 8].
Kenya, a lower middle-income country, has priori-
tized the attainment of UHC by 2022 through the
expansion of health insurance coverage by the Na-
tional Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) [9]. Current
NHIF coverage is 15.8%, which is equivalent to over
80% of the total population with any form of health
insurance in Kenya [10]. NHIF is a state corpor-
ation whose mandate is to provide health insurance
to its members and their dependents [11, 12]. It is
one of the healthcare purchasers and the largest
health insurer in Kenya with several health insur-
ance schemes (Table 1). Other healthcare pur-
chasers in Kenya include the national government,
the county governments, households and private
health insurers including community-based health
insurers [23, 24].
Previous empirical work on purchasing arrange-
ments in Kenya focused on the purchasing practices
of the NHIF, county governments, private and
community-based health insurers [23–25]. The previ-
ous study on NHIF, conducted in 2014, aimed to de-
scribe and analyse the purchasing arrangements
between NHIF and the government, healthcare pro-
viders and citizens [25]. That study, which was con-
ducted before the introduction of the new NHIF
reforms described further below, identified significant
weaknesses in the purchasing actions between the
NHIF as a purchaser and the government, citizens
and healthcare providers [25]. For example, along the
NHIF-government axis, the absence of an overarching
regulatory framework for health service purchasing
undermined NHIF’s performance. Along the NHIF-
citizen axis, the process for service entitlement design
was delinked from citizen preferences, needs and
Table 1 Health insurance schemes under the NHIF
Type of scheme Premium contribution Population covered
Civil servants schemea [13, 14] Mandatory/automatic Civil servants in the national and county governments, their declared spouse and up to
5 children of up to 21 years of age or 25 years if enrolled in fulltime formal education
[13, 14]
County government schemea [15] Mandatory/automatic Employees of County governments that have contract arrangements with the NHIF, their
declared spouse and up to 5 children of up to 21 years of age or 25 years if enrolled in
fulltime formal education [16]
Parastatal/ private company
schemesa [15]
Mandatory/automatic Employees of parastatals or private firms that have contract arrangements with NHIF,
their declared spouse and up to 5 children of up to 21 years of age or 25 years if
enrolled in fulltime formal education [16]
National police and Kenya
Prisonsa [17, 18]
Mandatory/automatic Kenya Police Force, Administration police, officers in the Criminal Investigations
Department, prisons and other security related officers, their declared spouse and up to
5 children up to 21 years of age or 25 years if enrolled in fulltime formal education [16]
Secondary schools’ scheme
[EduAfya] [12, 19, 20]
Mandatory/automatic All students in public secondary schools in Kenya
National scheme [21] -Mandatory for formal
sector workers,
-Voluntary for informal
sector workers
Any person who is a resident of the republic of Kenya, who is self-employed or in the in-
formal sector, their declared spouse (s) and children up to the age of 18 years
Health Insurance Subsidy for the
Poor [HISP] Scheme [22]
Mandatory/automatic Households with orphans and vulnerable children; poor elderly; and/ or persons, persons
with disabilities and destitute families
Linda Mama Free maternity
scheme [15]
Mandatory/automatic All pregnant women who are Kenyan Citizens
a The civil servants scheme, the national police and prisons service scheme, the county government schemes, and the parastatal/ private company schemes form
the enhanced benefits schemes because they offer comprehensive medical insurance covers [16].
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feedback. Along the NHIF-provider axis, weaknesses
included inadequate use of quality and efficiency-
improvement strategies such as treatment guidelines
and generic essential medicines lists [25].
Recent reforms by the NHIF
In 2015, NHIF introduced several linked reforms aimed
at accelerating the country’s progress towards UHC.
First, the NHIF revised premium contribution rates up-
wards (Table 2) with effect from April 1st, 2015 [26].
This was done to cater for the rising cost of healthcare
and to enable expansion of its benefits package [27].
Second, following the upward revision of the pre-
miums, the NHIF expanded its benefit cover to include
outpatient services for the national scheme (previously,
the NHIF covered outpatient services for beneficiaries of
the enhanced schemes and HISP only) and specialised
services for all the NHIF schemes [22]. The specialised
services offered include: renal dialysis; kidney transplant;
radiology package (magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
and computed tomography (CT)); oncology package
(chemotherapy and radiotherapy); chronic illness (dia-
betes and hypertension); maternity package (normal and
caesarean section); rehabilitation package (drug and sub-
stance abuse); specialised laboratory tests; surgical pack-
age (major, minor and specialised); foreign treatment;
and emergency evacuation services [22].
Third, the NHIF introduced new provider pay-
ment methods and rates for the new outpatient and
specialised benefit packages [22]. It introduced capi-
tation for outpatient services and, case-based and
fee-for- service payments for the specialised ser-
vices. It also revised the per diem rates for in-
patient care (already part of the old benefit
package) upwards from between KES 600 and 2400
(USD 6–24) [28] to between KES 1500 and 4000
(USD 15–40) per day for the lowest-level and
highest-level hospitals, respectively [22]. Table 3
provides a summary of the different payment
methods and rates under the NHIF.
These three purchasing reforms are UHC-inspired
reforms as they seek to expand the benefit package
and population covered while reducing the costs of
out-of-pocket (OOP) payments associated with the
use of these services [29] with important implica-
tions for the health systems goals of equity, effi-
ciency and quality [30]. These reforms, separately
and together, have the potential to influence the
purchasing practices of the NHIF. The aim of this
study is to examine the influence of the purchasing
reforms on NHIF’s purchasing practices and the im-
plications of this for strategic purchasing and health
system goals of equity, efficiency and quality.
Methods
Study design
We employed an embedded case study design [31]
with the NHIF as the case and the different reforms
as the embedded units of analysis. A case study is an
empirical enquiry that investigates a real-life
phenomenon through a detailed contextual analysis of
the phenomenon [31]. A case study approach is ap-
propriate for this study because it provides a struc-
tured yet flexible approach to data collection and
analysis using multiple sources of evidence [31, 32].
Study framework
We applied the Resilient and Responsive Health
Systems (RESYST) conceptual framework for pur-
chasing (Fig. 1). This framework outlines the key
strategic purchasing actions that characterise the
three purchaser relationships: Government and pur-
chasers, purchasers and healthcare providers, and
citizens and purchasers [2]. For this study, we
adapted the RESYST conceptual framework by in-
cluding the NHIF’s purchasing reforms and poten-
tial implications of the reforms on the health
systems goals mediated through the key purchasing
actions (Fig. 1). In this study, the purchaser is the
NHIF while the 1) government, 2) providers and 3)
citizens are represented by the 1) Ministry of
Table 2 NHIF premiums before and after the 2015 reform in Kenya shillings (KES)/ United States Dollars (USD)
Type of sector Monthly salary range 1USD = KES 100) Monthly premium before the
reform
Monthly premium after the
reform
Formal sector KES 1000–5999 (USD 10–59) KES 30–120 (USD 0.3–1.2) KES 150 (USD 1.5)
KES 6000–7999 (USD 60–79) KES 140–160 (USD 1.4–1.6) KES 300 (USD 3)
KES 8000–11,999 (USD 80–119) KES 180–240 (USD 1.8–2.4) KES 400 (USD 4)
KES 12,000–14,999 (USD 120–149) KES 260–300 (USD 2.6–3) KES 500 (USD 5)
KES 15,000 and above (USD 150 and
above)
KES 320 (USD 3.2) KES 600–1700 (USD 6–17)
Informal sector (self-
employed)
No salary ranges. KES 160 (USD 1.6) KES 500 (USD 5)
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Table 3 NHIF Provider payment methods and rates [22]
Provider
payment
method
Healthcare benefit package Reimbursement rate
1USD = 100 KES
Capitation Outpatient services for national scheme members KES 1200 (USD 12) per beneficiary
per year for basic care facilities
a(Level 3 and 4)
KES 1400 (USD 14) per beneficiary
per year for tertiary care facilities
a(Level 5 and 6)
Outpatient services for civil servants (and other enhanced schemes) of lower job group (A-K
or its equivalent)
KES 1500 (USD 15) Public hospitals
KES 2850 (USD 28.5) Private
hospitals
Case-based
payment
Renal dialysis (pre-dialysis, intra-dialysis and post-dialysis care) KES 9500 (USD 95) per session
twice weekly
Kidney transplant package- surgical costs and duration of hospitalization KES 500000 (USD 5000)
Maternity package for National scheme KES 10000 (USD 100) Normal child
birth
KES 30000 (USD 300) Caesarean
section
Maternity package for the Free maternity program KES 5000 (USD 50) for normal child
birth or caesarean section
Oncology package- treatment for cancer patients using radiotherapy or chemotherapy case
management
Radiotherapy
• KES 18000 (USD 180) per week
Chemotherapy
• Basic- KES 25000 (USD 250) per
cycle
• Complex- KES 150000 (USD
1500) per cycle
Surgical package (covers even cancer surgeries) Major surgeries
• KES 80000 (USD 800) for level 3
and 4 facilities
• KES 130000 (USD 1300) for level 5
and 6 facilities
Minor surgeries
• KES 30000 (USD 300) for level 3
and 4 facilities
• KES 40000 (USD 400) for level 5
and 6 facilities
Specialised surgeries
• KES 500000 (USD 5000)
Rehabilitation package (drug and substance abuse) KES 30000 (USD 300) per year
Fee-for-service Radiology package MRI capped at KES 15000 (USD
150)
CT scan capped at KES 8000 (USD
80)
Dental cover (Enhanced schemes only) [16] Capped at KES 50000 (USD 500) per
annum
Optical cover (Enhanced schemes only) [16] Capped at KES 40000 (USD 400) per
annum
Maternity package for Enhanced schemes Capped at KES 200000 (USD 2000)
Inpatient care (medical and surgical conditions that require admission) for Enhanced scheme
members of higher job groups (L and above or its equivalent) [14]
Job group or its
equivalent
Annual limit
L KES 1000000
(USD 10000)
M KES 1250000
(USD 12500)
N KES 1500000
(USD 15000)
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Health (MOH) (national government) and County
Department of Health (county government), 2) pub-
lic and private health facilities and, 3) NHIF benefi-
ciaries respectively. This study specifically focused
on the effect of the NHIF purchasing reforms on
the strategic purchasing actions involved in each of
the key relationships and the implications of this on
health system goals.
Study sites
We purposively selected respondents with know-
ledge of and experiences with NHIF since this was
the phenomenon of interest in our study [33]. We
selected participants at the national and county
level. Participants at the national level included
health financing stakeholders (policy makers, imple-
menters) and development organizations providing
technical and/or financial support to health
financing initiatives in Kenya. These participants in-
cluded officials from MOH, NHIF and development
partners. At the county level, we selected two coun-
ties (Table 4) with contrasting levels of socioeco-
nomic factors, health indicators, health sector
resource allocation (a proxy indicator of the im-
portance attached to the health sector by the re-
spective county), logistical reasons and safety
assurance for the researchers. We have anonymized
the counties to maintain confidentiality of the study
participants.
In each county, we selected three NHIF accre-
dited health facilities that could offer services
under the new benefit packages (that is, outpatient,
inpatient and specialised health services): one pub-
lic first referral (Level 4), one public second refer-
ral (Level 5) and one private (level 4) facility.
Permission to conduct the study in these facilities
Table 3 NHIF Provider payment methods and rates [22] (Continued)
Provider
payment
method
Healthcare benefit package Reimbursement rate
1USD = 100 KES
P KES 1750000
(USD 17500)
Q KES 2000000
(USD 20000)
R, S, T KES 2250000
(USD 22500)
Outpatient care (curative and preventive services) for Enhanced scheme members of higher
job groups (L and above or its equivalent) [14]
Job group or its
equivalent
Annual limit
L KES 100000
(USD 1000)
M KES 150000
(USD 1500)
N KES 200000
(USD 2000)
P KES 225000
(USD 2250)
Q KES 250000
(USD 2500)
R, S, T KES 350000
(USD 3500)
Per diem Comprehensive inpatient care (Covers medical and surgical conditions that require
admission)
KES 1500–4000 (USD 15–40) for
public (government) health facilities
and, low- cost private facilities and
mission hospitals. No co-payments.
Non- comprehensive inpatient care (Covers medical and surgical conditions that require
admission)
KES 2000–4000 (USD 20–40) for
high-end private hospitals. Mem-
bers pay top up deficit by self-pay
or co-insurance
Foreign treatment KES 1700 (USD 17) per day of
hospitalization
aLevel 3- Offer basic outpatient, basic maternity (obstetric) services and routine laboratory tests
Level 4- 1st referral hospitals. Offer a broader range of inpatient and outpatient care, emergency obstetric care, specialised laboratory and radiology services.
Level 5- 2nd referral hospitals. Offer more comprehensive specialised outpatient and inpatient curative services including intensive care.
Level 6- Highest level of care in the Kenyan health system. Offer highly specialised and complete set of care.
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was provided by the respective institutional heads.
Table 5 outlines the characteristics of the selected
hospitals which have been anonymized to maintain
confidentiality of the study participants.
Data collection
We collected data between September and December
2017 through in-depth interviews (IDIs), focus group
discussions (FGDs) and document reviews. All the par-
ticipants included in this study gave written
informed consent after being presented with infor-
mation on the organisation conducting the study,
why the study was being done and who the re-
searchers were. Two researchers (EK and RM) con-
ducted 41 IDIs in English with participants from
the national and county levels (Table 6) using
semi-structured interview guides developed from
the study’s conceptual framework (Fig. 1). First, we
developed interview questions specific to each re-
form using the relevant strategic purchasing
Fig. 1 Conceptual framework
Table 4 Characteristics of study counties
Characteristic County
I
County
II
Kenya
Projected population 2015 1,831,
800
1,107,
755
44,157,000
Unemployment rate 19% 12.5% 7.4%
Poverty rate 21.8% 60% 36.1%
Distribution of health facilities by
ownership
Private (for-profit and not-
for-profit)
80.5% 45% 50.3%
Public 19.5% 55% 49.7%
Doctor: population ratio 1:17000 1:44634 1:10000
Immunization coverage 90% 53.6% 80%
Percentage of County budget allocated to health (Financial Year)
FY 2015/16
32% 22% Average percentage of county budget allocated to health FY
2015/16 = 23.4%
*Target = 35%
Percentage of County budget allocated to health FY 2016/17 33% 27% Average percentage of county budget allocated to health FY
2016/17 = 25.2%
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actions as outlined in the framework. Then we de-
veloped probes relating to equity, efficiency and
quality based on broader reading of literature (See
Additional file 1: Semi-structured interview guide).
The trustworthiness or construct validity of the
semi-structured interview guide was tested by a
team of health economics researchers in our re-
search organization in Kenya who checked for am-
biguities and leading questions. All IDIs were
conducted at the participant’s workplace and were
audio-recorded using encrypted audio-recorders with
consent from the participants. Each IDI lasted be-
tween 35 and 70 min.
Two researchers (EK and RM) conducted 4 FGDs
with 51 NHIF members- 2 FGDs in each county in-
cluded in the study. Each FGD comprised of a total
of 10–16 NHIF members, both men and women of
various ages and employment status (formal and in-
formal) as identified by regional NHIF officials and
local community health volunteers. Table 7 provides
a summary of these characteristics. FGDs were con-
ducted at a location central to the participants. All
FGDs were recorded in Swahili using encrypted
audio-recorders with consent from the participants
and lasted between 60 and 90 min. Swahili was
chosen as the medium of communication for the
FGDs since community participants had varied
levels of education and hence varied levels of com-
petency in English but were all competent in Swa-
hili. The interviewers, EK and RM, were conversant
with Swahili which is Kenya’s national language.
Three researchers (EK, RM and EB) held face-to-face
peer debriefing sessions after conducting IDIs and
FGDS to critique the data collection process, identify
areas that needed further probing and to discuss the
emerging themes [34]. We stopped data collection
once saturation- point of no new information [35]-
was reached in both the IDIs and the FGDs.
Table 5 Characteristics of study hospitals
Characteristic Hospital A Hospital B Hospital C Hospital D Hospital E Hospital F
Ownership Public Public Public Public Private Private
Level Level 4 Level 4 Level 5 Level 5 Level 4 Level 4
County County I County II County I County II County I County II
Total annual outpatient attendance workload 294,352 121,661 330,022 283,677 19,153 18,539
Total annual inpatient admissions 20,534 11,593 22,013 22,622 3366 1984
Number of beds 289 195 457 265 20 36
Table 6 Summary of study respondents
National level respondents
Male Female Total
Ministry of Health 1 1
NHIF 1 1 2
Development partners 3 1 4
Total national level participants 5 2 7
County I County II Number
County level participants Male Female Male Female Total
County health department officials (County director of health, County nursing officers, county clinical
officers)
1 1 1 2 5
NHIF branch officials 2 1 1 1 5
Public hospital managers (Medical superintendent, Nursing services managers, Pharmacist in-charge, Clin-
ical officer in-charge)
1 2 2 2 7
Private hospital managers (Medical managers, Nursing services managers) 1 1 – 1 3
Public hospital frontline health workers (Clinical officers, Nurses) 1 1 1 1 4
Private hospital frontline health workers (Clinical officers, Nurses, pharmacists) 1 2 1 2 6
Public hospital NHIF billing clerks – 1 1 – 2
Private hospital accounts staff 1 – 1 2
Total county level participants 8 9 7 10 34
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Lastly, we reviewed policy documents (Table 8),
regulations, press releases, NHIF websites, grey
and peer reviewed literature for information re-
garding the new reforms, their effect on NHIF’s
purchasing actions and health system goals of
equity, efficiency and quality of health services.
Data management and analysis
All audio records from the IDIs were transcribed verbatim
in English. FGDs were transcribed verbatim in Swahili and
translated into English. All transcripts were reviewed for
transcription accuracy by comparing them against their
respective audio files. The transcripts were then imported
into QSR NVIVO 10 [36] to manage coding and analysis.
We used a Framework approach to analyse data.
The Framework approach is an analytic process that
involves a systematic process of sifting, sorting,
coding and charting data into key issues and
themes [37]. One researcher (RM) first familiarized
herself with the data through line-by-line reading
and re-reading of the transcripts. She then devel-
oped codes deductively from the study’s conceptual
framework and applied the codes to segments in
the transcripts that were interpreted as important.
All the study team members (AH, EB, EK, KH and
RM) then reviewed and discussed the initial coding
framework and coded data. Discrepancies in coding
were discussed and reconciled appropriately before
the final coding framework was approved by the
study team. Two researchers [EB and RM] then ap-
plied the final coding framework to the rest of the
data grouping similar codes into themes and later
charted the data to allow development of meaning
through comparisons and interpretations.
Results
The results are grouped in relation to each NHIF re-
form, and within each reform according to the relevant
purchasing relationships and actions (see Fig. 1).
NHIF reform 1: upward revision of premium contribution
rates
Purchaser-citizen relationship
Inadequate communication on the upward revision
of premium contribution rates The NHIF employed
various mass communication media to inform
members of the public of the new monthly
Table 7 Characteristics of FGD participants
Attribute County I County II
FGD I FGD II FGD I FGD II
Gender Male (n) = 6 Male (n) = 7 Male (n) =4 Male (n) = 5
Female (n) = 6 Female (n) = 9 Female (n) = 6 Female (n) = 8
Age range 28–57 31–65 25–53 33–67
Employment status Formal sector (n) = 9 Formal sector (n) =12 Formal sector (n) = 8 Formal sector (n) = 10
Informal sector (n) = 3 Informal sector (n) = 4 Informal sector (n) = 2 Informal sector (n) = 3
Total FGD participants (n = 51) County I (n) = 28 County II (n) = 23
Table 8 Documents included in the review
National
statutory
documents
The Constitution of Kenya
Vision 2030
Kenya Household Health Expenditure and Utilisation Survey.
Kenya Service Availability and Readiness Assessment Mapping (SARAM) Report.
Mini-service availability and readiness assessment (MINI-SARA) 2016 survey report
National Hospital Insurance Fund Act
NHIF documents Annual Management report 2015/16
Annual Management report 2016/17
Explanation of the benefit package for the National Scheme.
NHIF report on availability and quality of NHIF services at the healthcare provider and NHIF offices
Comprehensive medical insurance scheme for civil servants & disciplined services hand book
Handbook For Provision Of Comprehensive Medical Cover, Group Life Insurance and Last Expense Cover to Civil Servants
Enhanced Benefits Medical Scheme Book
National Police service & Kenya Prisons Service Comprehensive Medical Cover & Last Expense Handbook
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premium contribution rates, their timing, how to
remit them and penalties for late payments. The
channels included: television, radio, newspapers,
pamphlets, the NHIF website, social media, bill-
boards, mobile phones (short message service), and
sensitization campaigns at both national and
county levels. Study participants, however, felt that
communication through these channels did not
reach some key population groups such as the eld-
erly, the uneducated, the unemployed, people liv-
ing with disabilities (visual or hearing disabilities),
the poor and the people in the rural and margina-
lised areas. This was blamed on limited access to
these media platforms as well as limited number of
NHIF service points.
“Those people in remote areas have not been
reached especially where NHIF offices cover a
large area. They cannot give that information
immediately because it takes time for them to go
and access those people and give that information”
Male participant, NHIF, County I
These population groups were less likely to be aware of
the new premium rates. They continued making pre-
mium payments using old rates which limited their
access to the new benefit entitlements since they
were no longer considered active contributors.
“At the village, some people are not aware at all
of the increased premium rates and how they
operate. It is only when they go to the hospital
that they really get shocked that they cannot get
services and they are being told to go to the
NHIF office.” Male Participant, FGD I, County II
Unaffordability of the increased premium rates
limited access of certain citizen groups to the
entitlements Study participants considered the new
premium rates for the informal sector unfair and
unaffordable as they were fixed over quite large in-
come ranges. Premium contributions for the for-
mal sector were however graduated depending on
the salary range. Our review of the new premiums
rates showed that they were regressive as low-
income earning population groups in both the for-
mal and informal sectors contributed more of their
income towards the premiums than higher-income
earning groups (Fig. 2).
Unaffordability of the new premiums was consid-
ered a barrier to enrolment and hence a barrier to
access to needed care particularly for the un-
employed; those living in rural and marginalised
areas; the youth of 18 years and above but not en-
rolled in school; the elderly; people living with dis-
abilities and those in the informal sector with
meagre and unstable earnings.
“In the village, there are youths who have
finished school without formal employment but
their age surpasses the required age for the cover
under their parents. As a parent getting that 500
shillings to pay for him or her is a problem.
They are not covered.” Female participant, FGD II,
County II
Fig. 2 Regressivity of premium contribution rates after the reforms
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“There are quite a number of people who are not
taken care of like the disabled group who cannot
afford to pay for the national scheme. And where
do they fall? They also become sick. Unless
someone pays the money for them” Male manager,
private hospital F
FGD participants working in the informal sector
cited the higher premium rates as a cause of attri-
tion as they could no longer afford them. Docu-
ment reviews showed that while total NHIF
membership had grown from 4 million in 2012 to
6.8 million in 2017, only 48% of these members
were active contributors [15]. Active contributors
were fewer in the informal sector than formal sector.
Only 27% of informal sector members had active
membership compared to 65% of the formal sector
members as of June 2017 [15].
“Now we are required to pay 500 shillings. This
is too much money for poor people like me. I
have nowhere to get that kind of money. I felt
that I had no option but to abandon my card”
Female participant, FGD II, County I
“NHIF is for those who can afford” Male participant,
Development partner, National-level
NHIF reforms 2: introduction of new benefit packages
Purchaser-citizen relationship
Inadequate communication on the new benefit
packages The NHIF used the same channels used for
communicating the new premium rates to provide
information on the new benefit packages including
how and where to access them. To access outpatient
services, NHIF members and their dependents were
expected to pre-select a health facility of their choice
[38, 39] by completing a choice of outpatient med-
ical facility form [40]. On the other hand, pre-
selection was not required for NHIF members and
their dependents to access specialised services. Just
as with communication of the new premium rates,
study participants felt that the elderly, uneducated,
unemployed, people living with disabilities, poor and
people in the rural and marginalised areas were less
aware of the new benefits or where and how to ac-
cess them. The lack of awareness limited their access
to and utilisation of these new services. Document
review showed that there was low enrolment for out-
patient services with only 21% of the registered
members having selected their preferred healthcare
providers [22]. This was partly attributed to poor
communication of the access requirements to the
NHIF beneficiaries [22].
“They are not fully aware because some people
will say ‘I have registered under NHIF’ but they
do not know there is something called capitation
and there are restrictions with capitation. You
only go where you are capitated. They must be
told categorically that with NHIF, they and their
dependents must be capitated somewhere to
access the outpatient services. They also do not
know that for inpatient care, they can go
anywhere. Even those who are capitated in this
hospital think that they must come for admission
in this hospital not knowing that they can also
be admitted anywhere else as long as they have
the cover and that they meet the category of the
hospital.” Male manager, Hospital F, County II
Some FGD members and development partners felt
that knowledge and awareness of the new reforms
by certain population groups was limited by: 1) the
use of complex language (such as medical terms)
to describe the services offered, 2) vagueness of
the benefit package where services were presented
in broad categories making it difficult for users to
know what specific services they are entitled to, 3)
limited geographical coverage of communication
and sensitization campaigns and, 4) limited know-
ledge and awareness among some healthcare pro-
viders who were gatekeepers for access to these
services.
“There is a problem in NHIF. They have not
done communication to all health facilities that
we have registered with. Sometimes you are
chased away and they do not normally honour
us” Male participant, FGD I, County II
The benefit packages were based on service needs,
preferences and values of the population The choice
of services included in the new benefit packages
was informed by population health needs and pref-
erences based on disease burden from the claims
received at the NHIF office, national disease burden
as indicated in national reports and strategies, and
complaints and preferences provided by patient
support groups and NHIF beneficiaries themselves.
“We knew the needs of our members. Some of the
biggest health problems were oncology and
surgeries. There was also this study on non-
communicable diseases that was done by the
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Ministry that showed that cancers, diabetes and
hypertension were on the rise. We also considered
information from our data, and from complaints
and requests received from our members through
their own groups like the Kidney care group
which pushed us to include dialysis sessions.”
Female participant, NHIF, National level
Frontline providers and FGD participants also felt
that the services offered under the new benefit
packages addressed prevailing disease burden.
“Yes, people’s needs are covered. Majority of our patients
come here with typhoid and malaria which are covered.
If somebody has hernia or needs a caesarean section,
surgery can be done. Normal deliveries are also covered.
If somebody needs laboratory tests, they can be
done. Most of the important things that the
patients need are covered.” Female frontline
provider, private hospital F
“The advantage lies in the fact that we can now get
treatment for life threatening ailments such as cancer,
cardiovascular disease, diabetes and others” Male
participant, FGD I, County I
Unequal distribution of entitlements in the new
benefit packages across different population groups
limited citizen’s access to the entitlements While the
new benefit packages were responsive to the needs
of the citizens, study participants reported that civil
servants and other members of the enhanced
schemes received a wider range of services com-
pared to members of the National scheme and
HISP. A comparison of the benefit packages across
the different NHIF schemes from document reviews
showed that beneficiaries of the National scheme
and HISP were not entitled to preventive health
services and a few other curative services that bene-
ficiaries of enhanced schemes receive (Appendix).
These differences led beneficiaries of the National
scheme to make additional OOP payments to access
needed services.
“Late last year, my mother was hospitalized at the
district hospital. We bought medicines daily. When we
went to collect the prescribed medicines in the
pharmacy, there were some classifications. There were
those who were given medicines but told to pay more
and those with an enhanced scheme who got medicines
for free. This disparity brought a lot of problems
because you see your next neighbour, who is a patient
like you, being served while you cannot get the same
medicines without buying them.” Female participant,
FGD I, County II
Government- purchaser relationship
Presence of service delivery infrastructure gaps for
the new benefit packages in public healthcare
facilities While the new reforms included new bene-
fit entitlements, they were not accompanied by re-
forms on infrastructure improvement. Study
participants reported that contracted public hospi-
tals, particularly in rural and marginalised areas,
lacked appropriate service delivery infrastructure for
the outpatient and special benefit packages in terms
of medical equipment, medicines and human re-
sources (medical officers, specialists and nurses). A
review of the service availability and readiness as-
sessment reports supported these claims as they
highlighted the limited availability of: 1) essential
medicines [41], 2) laboratory supplies [42] and, 3)
specialised services such as dialysis, chemotherapy,
radiotherapy and organ transplants [42] in public
hospitals.
“There is a shortage of doctors and specialists like
oncologists. Public hospitals are also overstretched and
they do not have tests such as CT Scan or ultrasound
which forces you to seek care in a private hospital. So,
in as much as you have an NHIF card, it is not very
useful in a public hospital because you will not get the
services.” Female participant, FGD II, County I
Purchaser- provider relationship
Selection and contracting of providers was
characterized by a pro-urban and pro-private
distribution To increase access to the new benefit pack-
ages, the NHIF embarked on a drive to expand the net-
work of healthcare facilities to contract with. Between
2013 and 2017, the number of contracted healthcare fa-
cilities (both public and private) increased from 1237 to
5258. Study respondents reported that most of the
contracted health facilities within their counties were
found in the urban and peri-urban areas, particularly
private hospitals, which created greater geographical in-
equalities in access for the people living in rural and
marginalised areas.
“NHIF historically was only covering hospitals and we
know that in terms of facility density, most of the
facilities in rural areas are primary level so already
there is a disproportion there. Even with the hospitals,
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it was a specific set of them. Not all hospitals were
NHIF accredited. Now they have started going to the
primary level facilities but not all of them have been
brought on board. Therefore, access to care in rural
areas is much lower than in urban centres and we
know that the larger proportion of our population lives
in rural areas.” Female participant, Development
partner, National-level
Document review showed that private health facilities
(both private-for-profit and private-not-for-profit)
accounted for 75.5 and 56.9% of all health facilities
contracted by NHIF in County I and II, respectively.
While this finding may be expected for county I which
has a higher proportion of private health facilities, it was
not expected for county II which had a higher propor-
tion of public than private health facilities. NHIF officials
felt that this resulted from a lack of initiative by govern-
ment health facilities to seek contracts with NHIF as
well as staff shortages within NHIF to do active follow
up on the same.
“Private hospitals are more. It is only when we started
the government initiative of Linda mama [free
maternity programme] that we brought in so many
government health facilities. However, it is not easy to
bring them on board because they are not motivated
even to come here. It is us to communicate with them,
call them for letters or deliver those letters to them
which is not easy. But for private facilities, it is a self-
initiative.” Female participant, NHIF branch official,
County II
FGD participants felt that the pro-private distribu-
tion of contracted health facilities within their
counties was discriminatory because it was mainly
civil servants who could access services in these fa-
cilities. Access to the health facilities varied by type
of scheme. Members of the national scheme
accessed services from contracted public facilities or
low-cost private hospitals. Civil servants and mem-
bers of enhanced schemes could access both
contracted public and private health facilities in-
cluding high cost private hospitals [14, 16, 18]. In
addition, FGD participants felt that services offered
in private-for-profit hospitals were more expensive
than in the public hospitals which put them at risk
of making additional OOP payments or depleting
the limits capped on specialized services by the
NHIF.
“I took my son to a private hospital where he was
diagnosed with ulcers caused by H. pylori. His
medicines cost almost 14,000 shillings. I panicked
because I knew we would exhaust our yearly
allocations. I also developed the same problem but
I went to the Level 5 public hospital. The
treatment did not cost me more than 800 shillings.
I even argued with the doctor about this. How
comes my son’s H. pylori kits cost 14,000 in the
private hospital but it cost me less than a
thousand shillings in a public hospital? This is
very bad” Male participant, FGD I, County I
NHIF reforms 3: introduction of new provider payment
methods and rates
Purchaser- provider relationship
The new provider payments did not incentivize
equity, efficiency and quality healthcare service
provision due to perceived inadequacy in payment
rates Both public and private providers indicated
that the capitation rates offered for outpatient ser-
vices were inadequate as they did not take into
consideration the actual costs of services or the
number of times an NHIF beneficiary would visit a
health facility. NHIF officials reported that the capi-
tation rate was informed by consultations with bod-
ies representing both public and private providers
and, findings from actuarial analysis and costing
studies. However, officials from development part-
ners, county department of health and county
health facilities reported not being involved or even
aware of any actuarial costing studies.
“I remember being in those discussions a while back
where we were asking NHIF officials what the basis
for the capitation was. They kept saying that they
had done some costing studies but they never
shared any of that information. We wanted to know
the basis of going from 2,850 shillings for the civil
servants to 1,200 shillings for the national scheme. I
mean at least for the reimbursements for the special
packages they could go and observe what the
market rates are, right?” Female participant,
Development partner, National-level
The perceived inadequacy of capitation incentivized
some public providers to ask patients, particularly
those with chronic illness, to buy medication else-
where. For private providers, it incentivised them to
either undertreat, charge co-payments, refer to
other accredited health facilities or, admit NHIF
beneficiaries who would have otherwise just re-
quired outpatient care. Media reports indicated that
major private hospitals had altogether rejected capi-
tation which further limited access to care for
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members of the national scheme [43, 44]. Health-
care providers did not understand that capitation
refers to a fixed amount of money paid per patient
per unit of time based on population level data on
costs and average utilization of services.
“For fee-for-service, we can do more laboratory
tests compared to the national scheme. For na-
tional scheme, I am told not to send them to the
laboratory for many investigations because their
capitation money will be exhausted just from con-
sultation without even medication. So, I am forced
to treat clinically yet some patients require a con-
clusive test that will help us manage them well.
Yes, we are forced to cut on cost.” Male frontline
provider, private hospital F
Provider payments were not timely According to
public and private hospital managers, the NHIF
did not make timely payments to providers for the
provision of services outlined in its benefit pack-
ages including the new outpatient and specialised
services. In policy, capitation for outpatient ser-
vices was to be paid before service delivery (at the
beginning of each fiscal quarter) while payments
for inpatient and specialised services were to be
reimbursed within 14 working days following sub-
mission of claims data [45]. In practice however,
NHIF disbursed capitation in the middle of the fis-
cal quarter and took between 2 and 3 months to
honour and reimburse claims for inpatient and
specialised services. This was attributed to the
manual claim process that was demanding, the
limited number of NHIF claims and benefits offi-
cers, and reports of limited financial resources
within the NHIF.
“So even claims that we took two months ago
have not been reimbursed because they are down
financially. The NHIF informed us that they do
not have money” Male manager, public hospital C,
County II
NHIF beneficiaries seeking care in private facilities
felt that the delayed reimbursements by NHIF had
incentivized providers to: 1) introduce co-payments,
2) deny or ration services offered to them, 3) treat
them with less respect, or 4) expose them to longer
waiting times than patients with other forms of in-
surance or cash paying patients.
“Private hospitals do not treat us with respect.
There is even a notice, “do not give these
medicines to NHIF patients” in their pharmacy. If
you peep inside, you will see the label. It is as if
you are a second-class citizen from those with
other medical covers who are treated superiorly.”
Female participant, FGD II, County II
“It is like torture there because those who have cash
are treated quickly. So, at times when I go to the
hospital, I feel that it is better for me to use cash than
to use my NHIF card so that I can get treatment
faster.” Female participant, FGD II, County I
Weak financial accountability led to fraud by
healthcare providers, NHIF officials and NHIF
beneficiaries Respondents reported various cases of
fraudulent behaviour for financial gains by health-
care workers, NHIF officials and NHIF beneficiar-
ies- a finding that was supported by various media
reports [46–48].
“There has been massive fraud. Some of the
providers are working with people at the NHIF to
defraud NHIF and one of the areas they have
been taking advantage of is the issue of major
surgery and minor surgery. Most hospitals have
been converting the minor surgeries to major
surgeries so that they can get higher
reimbursement. The fraud has been there but it
has become a big issue since the introduction of
those specialised packages” Male participant,
Development partner, national-level
Several system weaknesses had led to this. First,
the self-assessment process- whereby health facil-
ities could assess their own structural capacity
prior to contracting [49]- created a loophole for
fraudulent behaviour. County officials reported
that some providers exaggerated their structural
capacity (e.g. beds, medical equipment and theatre
rooms) during this process to obtain a higher level
of reimbursements from per diem and case-based
payments for inpatient and specialised services re-
spectively.
“When we looked at the facility, they did not have
a theatre yet NHIF said they were making claims
for operations done. So how did they do the
operations without the theatre? It was
questionable. There was a room that they said was
a theatre but we know that a theatre is not just a
room. The facility did not have all the things
required to make a theatre” Male county level
manager, County I
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Secondly, the limited number of NHIF officials
(claims and benefits officers, and quality assurance
officers) undermined frequent surveillance of health
facilities. Their limited number coupled with the
manual claim confirmation and reimbursement
process and increased workload, created a barrier to
a fast and efficient process of confirming the au-
thenticity of claims.
“Surveillance should be done at least twice a week
but we face challenges. There are many
contracted health facilities and fewer quality
officers so it is not easy for us to reach all of
them. So now we do what we call smart
surveillance- where we visit health facilities with
high claim notifications” Female NHIF branch
official, County II
Thirdly, weak identification processes for NHIF
beneficiaries seeking care incentivized some benefi-
ciaries to engage in fraudulent behaviour such as:
1) use of false identity cards to obtain care, 2) hir-
ing out of the NHIF cards to those without but
who needed access to care, 3) use of NHIF cards to
illegally obtain medication for people who were not
members of the scheme or, 4) impersonation.
“The challenge we have in government (public) facilities
is actually that of fraud through impersonation where
one gives their card to their sibling to pass as them in
order to use the card to access services” Male NHIF
branch official, County I
NHIF officials and media reports indicated that the NHIF
was however implementing various strategies to curb
fraudulent activities such as: online notifications for in-
patient admissions, centralised authorisation (letters of
undertaking) for surgical procedures and specialised im-
aging studies [50] and, introduction of biometrics for
identification of beneficiaries.
“We are going the biometric way. We assessed and provided
some health facilities with the gadgets and software. Once
we have all the biometric features for the members, we will
reduce cases of impersonation and cases of patients not
being in the wards when they were supposedly admitted.”
Male NHIF branch official, County II
Discussion
In this study, we set out to examine how the recent
reforms of the NHIF affected its purchasing prac-
tices. Our study findings show that even with the
new reforms, the NHIF remains a passive purchaser
with negative implications for equity, efficiency and
quality arising from weaknesses in either the design
or implementation of the reforms.
Equity implications
First, the higher premium rates were unaffordable and re-
gressive for the poor, elderly, people living with disabilities,
unemployed and informal sector workers with meagre and
unstable earnings. This policy design created a financial
barrier to enrolment and led to attrition. Affordability of
premium contributions has been shown to affect enrolment
and retention in other LMIC settings such as Ghana [51–
53], Uganda [54], Burkina Faso [55] and Nigeria [56]. In
Ghana, informal sector contributions were found to be par-
ticularly regressive [57]. Second, differences in the bene-
fit package between the national scheme and
enhanced schemes, a policy design issue, led to in-
equities in access to services and OOP payments for
the services not covered. Differences in benefit pack-
age design lead to differences in financial protection
where generous benefit packages are associated with
lower OOP payments [58, 59]. Third, limited aware-
ness of the new benefits and premiums by the poor,
elderly, unemployed, informal sector workers, people
in the rural areas and those with disabilities due to
varying access to mass media and NHIF service
points, a policy implementation issue, led to varia-
tions in enrolment, access to care and unnecessary
OOP payments. Studies in Nigeria, Burkina Faso,
Kenya and Ghana have shown that awareness of
insurance schemes affects participation and enrol-
ment [56, 60–62] as well as service utilisation
among enrolees as seen in India [63]. A guiding
principle for purchasers is that communication of
UHC-inspired reforms should inform the population
of their entitlements and obligations [2, 64] through
public provision of detailed but simplified informa-
tion on included and excluded services and the as-
sociated levels of OOPs [30, 65]. This empowers
beneficiaries, particularly marginalised groups, to
claim their benefits and entitlements and improves
utilisation among these population groups [30]. It
also provides one of the best strategies to reduce
possible variations in access to care [65] and infor-
mal or OOP payments by beneficiaries to providers
[65, 66]. A fourth factor undermining equity was
the pro-urban and pro-private distribution of
contracted health facilities. This policy implementa-
tion issue undermined access for the poor and
those living in rural and marginalised areas who are
known to have higher burden of disease and limited
financial protection [67] which predisposes them to
catastrophic health expenditures [68]. In Kenya,
65.3% of rural populations depend on public health
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facilities for outpatient services [69]. In fact, private
hospitals (both for-profit and not-for-profit) have
been shown to be pro-rich [70]. Decisions to in-
crease coverage should therefore give priority to
these groups [4, 30] and to the public sector by en-
suring that it is well-funded and well- structured
with adequate service delivery infrastructure [4, 71].
Lastly, perceived inadequacy of, and delayed NHIF
reimbursements, a policy implementation issue, led
to preferential treatment of privately insured and/ or
uninsured cash-paying patients over NHIF benefi-
ciaries particularly in private hospitals. The provider
incentives embodied in payments systems influence
provider behaviour in treatment decisions which in
turn affect equity in access to needed services, qual-
ity and efficiency of service provision [8, 72].
Efficiency implications
We identified two main implications for efficiency. First,
unnecessary admissions and referrals due to perceived
inadequacy of capitation rates, a policy design and imple-
mentation issue, compromised efficiency since resources
were spent on unnecessary care. Second, weak accountabil-
ity mechanisms, a policy implementation issue, compro-
mised efficiency through loss of resources to fraudulent
activities. Unnecessary hospital admissions and fraud are
among the top ten causes of inefficiency in health systems
globally [3].
Quality implications
Quality of care particularly in public hospitals was com-
promised by lack of accompanying reforms on quality and
infrastructure improvement- a weakness in the design and
implementation of the new policies. High quality care re-
quires skilled health workers, well-equipped hospitals and
reliable medicines [73] that are equitably distributed to
promote equitable access to services in the benefit pack-
age [5]. Reforms of benefit packages should also inform
infrastructure developments [30, 65], failure to which
makes the benefit package merely a wish list, with limited
access to actual services and limited financial risk protec-
tion [65]. Quality was also compromised by ration-
ing of services to patients due to perceived low
provider payment rates and delayed reimburse-
ments which are both weaknesses in the design
and implementation of the new policies.
Recommendations
Drawing from these findings, we recommend that policy
makers at the national and county governments as well as
the NHIF, address weaknesses in the design and imple-
mentation of the reforms for them to be successful.
The National and county governments should improve
the infrastructural capacity of public healthcare facilities
to support the UHC- inspired NHIF reforms. This in-
cludes priority attention to human resource for health,
medicines, and medical equipment. They should also
find innovative ways of financing premiums for the
poor, elderly, people with disabilities, unemployed
and those in the informal sector in a bid to leave
no one behind. This can be done through specific
allocation of general government revenue.
For its part, the NHIF should first, re-orient its facility se-
lection to create a balance between public and private facil-
ities, and between urban and rural facilities to improve
geographical access. Second, engage healthcare providers in
determining provider payment rates and publicly avail infor-
mation on how the rates are developed. This will improve
provider acceptance. Third, actively educate health workers
on the services offered in the benefit package as they are the
gatekeepers who provide access to health services. Fourth,
ensure timely reimbursements to healthcare facilities to send
the correct incentives for service delivery. Fifth, invest in
fraud minimization strategies such as verification of provider
self-assessments reports and claims as well as enrolee mem-
bership. This can be implemented by using a risk-
based approach to sample facilities for physical
verification of self-assessment reports and imposing
tough sanctions for providers that are found to
present fraudulent self-assessment reports and for
those enrolees and providers engaging in fraud.
Sixth, harmonize its benefit packages into one
benefit package for all its members to reduce in-
equities in access to needed services. Seventh, sim-
plify the language used in communication of the
benefit packages and adopt communication strat-
egies that reach low-income, less educated, rural
population groups such as visits to homes and pub-
lic places such as markets and places of religious
worship. Lastly, the NHIF should strengthen moni-
toring and supervision of healthcare providers and
impose sanctions and rewards for quality of care
provided.
Conclusion
Our study shows that while the new reforms sought to ex-
pand population and service coverage and reduce OOP, the
NHIF remains a passive purchaser due to weaknesses in the
design and implementation of the reforms. These weaknesses
affected its purchasing actions with negative implications for
the health system goals of equity, efficiency and quality. For
the reforms to accelerate the country’s progress towards
UHC, policy makers from the government (both national and
county) as well as the NHIF should put deliberate efforts to
align the design and implementation of such reforms with
strategic purchasing actions that are aimed at improving
equity, efficiency, and quality of health system delivery.
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Appendix
Table 9 Comparison of the benefit packages across schemes
Services Enhanced schemes: (Civil servants and disciplined services scheme;
County schemes, National Police Service and Kenya Prisons Service
Medical Scheme [15, 18–20])
National scheme and HISP [23]
Outpatient Consultation Consultation
Laboratory investigations Laboratory investigations
Drug administration Drug administration
Radiological examinations (basic x-rays) Radiological examinations (basic x-rays)
Nursing and midwifery services Nursing and midwifery services
Minor surgical procedures Minor surgical procedures
Rehabilitation services rehabilitation services
Referral for specialised services Referral for specialised services
Dental care: Dental consultation Dental consultation
Extractions Extraction only
Surgical extractions (including doctors’ fees
and theatre costs)
Root canal
Orthodontics
Dental Filling
X-rays
Dentures
Optical services
Vaccinations KEPI vaccines KEPI vaccines
Rota virus vaccine
Anti-rabies
Anti-Snake venom
yellow fever vaccine
Emergency rescue
services:
Local road ambulance Local road ambulance
Emergency air rescue
Annual medical check-up
i. Body mass index
ii. Full Haemogram
iii. Cholesterol
iv. Blood sugar
v. Gamma GT
vi. Urinalysis
vii. PSA (Prostate Specific Antigen for Men above 40)
viii. Pap smear for all women
ix. Mammogram
Optical care
Specialized
services
Renal dialysis Renal dialysis
Kidney care package (Renal dialysis and renal transplant) Kidney care package (Renal dialysis and renal transplant)
Rehabilitation package: drug and substance abuse Rehabilitation package: drug and substance abuse
Oncology: chemotherapy and radiotherapy Oncology: chemotherapy and radiotherapy
Radiology: MRI, CT scan Radiology: MRI, CT scan
Chronic illness: diabetes and hypertension Chronic illness: diabetes and hypertension
Surgical services (Major and minor) Surgical services (Major and minor)
Specialised laboratory tests Specialised laboratory tests
Overseas treatment for conditions that warrant treatment not
available in Kenya
Overseas treatment for conditions that warrant treatment
not available in Kenya
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